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Varieties of Collaboration: The case of an Australian retail union 
 
 
Abstract 
Much has been written about varieties of collaboration and the interplay between conflict and 
collaboration in industrial relations. This article explores the preconditions, processes and 
outcomes associated with the collaborative strategies of an Australian retail trade union: the 
Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees’ Association. The data were collected from an 
extensive series of interviews with officials and organisers within the union across all Australian 
states. We find that despite taking a servicing approach, and indeed never aggressively 
organising members, the union has managed to achieve a range of outcomes that exceed retail 
employment conditions in other countries. We argue that this is partly a result of the Australian 
legislative framework, which is inherently pluralist and supportive of collective bargaining. This 
environment, whereby unions are not forced to fight to represent members, can be conducive to 
collaborative employment relations, particularly in industries where the parties do not adopt an 
adversarialist stance.  
 
Introduction  
In the world of work, ‘relations between workers and employers necessarily involve conflict and 
collaboration’ [emphasis in original] (Kelly 1998: 8). Industrial relations researchers have tended 
to focus on conflict, paying comparatively little attention to co-operation, collaboration and 
compromise. This gap is particularly evident in recent research on trade unions, which tends to 
focus on organising strategies designed to achieve union power ‘over’ the employer, rather than 
on the broader remit of union activities, some of which may aim to create union power ‘with’ the 
employer. Further, the literature on collaboration is ‘siloed’ into varied ‘national’ approaches, 
such as European social partnership, British workplace partnership and North American ‘mutual 
gains’, without cross-fertilisation between the different streams. Studies in other national 
contexts are therefore imperative to explore some of the reasons why and how collaborative 
relationships develop within particular contexts.  
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In this paper, we explore why and how Australia’s largest union, the Shop, Distributive and 
Allied Employees’ Union (SDA) develops relationships with capital, based on the perceptions of 
SDA officials.  This case extends research on collaboration by considering a national context in 
which there is neither ‘hard’ nor ‘soft’ regulation for collaboration, but where legislative support 
for collective bargaining (and for union recognition) is relatively high.  The SDA, while referred 
to pejoratively as a ‘business union’ (McCann 1994; Game and Pringle 1983), has been 
remarkably successful as an organisation, as measured by a number of indicators, including 
growth and size, and pay increases relative to statutory minimum conditions. It negotiates in a 
relatively non-adversarial way, due to the Australian regulatory environment, and the nature and 
culture of the retail industry and the union itself. In the Australian retail industry, collective 
agreements are broad in scope and incorporate clauses covering ‘voice’ mechanisms and ‘mutual 
gains’ outcomes, akin to UK ‘partnership’ agreements. The SDA negotiates in exchange for 
various forms of ‘union encouragement’ by major retailers (Mortimer 2001a), as well as 
measurable benefits for those covered by agreements. The significance of our research is that 
much of the literature on forms of collaboration tends to discount or ignore collective bargaining, 
viewing it as separate from collaboration, partnership or mutual gains (Godard and Delaney 
2000) rather than (potentially) complementary. Our argument in this paper is that in the right 
context, there is no sharp delineation between collective bargaining and collaboration.   
In the first section of the paper, we explore the theoretically focused literature on collaboration 
and the relevant contextual features that shape ‘compromise’ in the workplace. We then look at 
the ‘varieties of collaboration’ that exist in different national contexts, before moving to examine 
the context for retail employment relations, particularly in Australia. The main section of the 
paper summarises our findings, using a conceptual framework drawn from the literature on 
collaboration (Wood & Gray 1991). We then analyse and explore the implications of those 
findings for our research questions.  
Collaboration 
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From a conceptual viewpoint, many authors have pointed to the notorious ‘slipperiness’ of the 
term ‘collaboration’. Its meaning shifts ‘depending on the particular interests being promoted or 
the purposes to which it is put’ (Haynes and Allen 2001: 166-7). In broad terms, collaboration: 
occurs when a group of autonomous stakeholders of a problem domain engage in an 
interactive process, using shared rules, norms and structures, to act or decide on issues 
related to that domain (Wood and Gray 1991: 140). 
We adopt Wood and Gray’s (1991) approach, which draws on organizational theory, to  frame 
our analysis.  They argue that a key limitation of most existing perspectives on collaboration is 
that they are oriented toward the individual focal organisation (a firm) rather than toward an 
interorganisational ‘problem domain’. In arguing that the focus must shift from the organisation 
to the domain, there is  recognition of the importance of collaboration as an interorganisational 
phenomenon, designed to achieve desired ends that no single organisation could achieve acting 
unilaterally. At the same time, collaboration can take place without the parties necessarily 
achieving their objectives. Usefully, they identify three key issues which cut across all 
theoretical perspectives: the parties’ intent and the preconditions that make collaboration 
possible and motivate stakeholders to participate; the process through which collaboration 
occurs; and the outcomes of collaboration. 
Forms of collaboration between trade unions and management can be analysed in various ways.  
From a ‘national industrial relations systems’ perspective (institutional/political), there are three 
main versions of collaboration, each of which is geographically and historically contingent.  
These are: 1) formal (social) partnership models as in Europe; 2) formal (market) partnership 
models as in the UK; and 3) informal (market) partnership models as in the US. In practice, some 
arrangements operate at the organisational and workplace level, such as US approaches to 
‘mutual gains’ which rest on the notion of high performance work systems (HPWS) (Kochan and 
Osterman 1994; Budd, Gomez and Meltz 2004). European approaches rely on legislation and 
mandatory structures (in large firms) such as works councils, resulting in a diversity of national 
settlements concerning how collaboration is implemented (Dølvik and Waddington 2004; 
Hyman 2005; Gajewska and Niesyto 2009). Other national approaches lack a legislative basis 
and are strongly voluntarist, but have government support and funding: UK ‘partnership 
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agreements’ are one such model (Brown and Oxenbridge 2004; Kelly 2004; Johnstone, Ackers 
and Wilkinson 2009, 2010). In Australia and New Zealand there have been only episodic 
attempts at ‘soft’ intervention as a means to promote collaboration, such as via a ‘best practice’ 
program in Australia in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Macneil, Haworth and Rasmussen 2011). 
We argue that these varied types of collaboration are best analysed using a conceptual 
framework that takes a ‘deeper’ account of what collaboration actually is.  
Adapting Wood and Gray’s (1991) schema, preconditions for successful union-management 
collaboration include the institutional basis of collaboration; that is the degree of state and 
legislative support for collaboration per se. We would also argue that wider industrial 
arrangements governing industrial relations, including those relating to union recognition and 
collective bargaining, are preconditions. As we will argue in this paper, those arrangements in 
Australia are somewhat more favourable for unions in traditionally ‘non-militant’ industries than 
is the case in many other countries.  With respect to intent, differing forms of union-management 
collaboration have very different ideologies and underlying norms. The formal model of 
European social partnership derives from Catholic social teaching ‘with its emphasis on the 
functional interdependence (but by no means equal status) of employers and workers’ (Hyman 
2005: 251-2). UK-style partnership agreements have their genesis in a pluralist ‘third way’ 
ideology which aims to replace adversarialist forms of engagement based on conflict and tension 
(Dietz, Cullen and Coad 2005; Johnstone et al. 2010; Martinez Lucio and Stuart 2004). In the 
US, the ideological underpinnings of ‘mutual gains’ HPWS approaches range from highly 
unitarist to mildly pluralist. Processes derive from the institutional supports for collaboration, 
and the wider political and industrial relations arrangements. Processes also include the level and 
scope of collaboration (Bacon and Blyton 2007; Roche 2009). We would say longevity and 
pervasiveness are part of the processes, the latter referring to how widespread collaboration is in 
the industry. Outcomes reflect the prevailing preconditions, intent and processes and are a matter 
for empirical examination.  
We argue in this paper, therefore, that rather than dismissing less militant unions and those that 
are not adopting the organising model in its entirety as ‘business unions’, we should unpack their 
approaches to collaboration analytically.  For the purposes of this paper, our research questions 
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are threefold. What are the preconditions for the SDA’s collaboration with retail employers? 
What is the SDA’s intent? What are the processes used? (How was a particular method of 
collaboration enacted and what strategic choices were made by the union)? What is the outcome? 
(The scope of issues includes the gains and losses that have accrued to the union and the degree 
of longevity and pervasiveness of the arrangements). For the purposes of examining 
collaboration from the perspective of a trade union and in particular, union officials, we discuss 
our case study data by drawing upon the institutional/negotiated order and political theoretical 
perspectives identified by Wood and Gray (1991) to examine critical domain questions such as 
power and resources. We turn now to examine the nature of the retail sector, and the character of 
its unions, before presenting our findings on the SDA.  
The Retail Context 
Retail comprises a sizeable proportion of global employment: over 10 per cent in developed 
economies (Bozhurt and Grugulis 2011). The bulk of retail employment exists in the large 
multiples, particularly in grocery retailers which exert oligopolistic market power (Baret et al. 
2000; IBIS World 2008).  Historically, retail has been a highly localised industry, but the advent 
of internet shopping, or e-tailing, means retailers now offer online services in addition to store-
based services; that is, ‘clicks and mortar’ (Grewal, Iyer and Levy 2004), and reduce labour input 
through the use of scanning technology, including customer self-scanning (Price 2011). Retail is 
an industry with low profit margins – 5 per cent before tax in Australia compared to an all 
industry average of 11 per cent (Productivity Commission 2011). Hence, retailers try to reduce 
labour costs which, while a relatively small proportion of overheads (generally less than 10 per 
cent) (Price 2004), are one of the easiest variable costs to control. Low wages in retail are 
therefore a global phenomenon (Tilly and Carré 2011).  Retailers are also increasingly 
employing part-time, temporary and young workers to respond to customer peaks and troughs in 
the context of extended trading hours (Price 2005). Staff turnover in the industry is high (Ikeler 
2011; O’Brien-Smith & Rigby 2010; Price 2004). These employment practices are a major 
reason for low retail union membership (Lucas 2009), high turnover (Lynch et al. 2011) and, to 
some extent, membership passivity.  As a consequence, international research shows that retail 
unions generally have little power, and that the range of strategic options available to retail 
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unions is limited (Dolvik and Waddington 2004; Gajewska and Niesyto 2009; Haynes and Allen 
2001; Ikeler 2011; O’Brien-Smith & Rigby 2010; Royle and Ortiz 2009; Tilly and Galvan 2006).  
The Australian retail sector reflects the broader international situation. Australian retail employs 
around ten per cent of the workforce; is highly concentrated even by international standards, 
particularly in the supermarket sector (IBIS World 2008); is increasingly adopting scanning and 
other technology; and its use of part-time, casual workers, particularly youth, is very high.  
Contingent youth work is underpinned by low youth wages: a 15-year-old is paid 45 per cent of 
the adult rate. Retail employment practices, in turn, shape the strategies of the SDA.  
The Retail Union in Australia 
The SDA is the main Australian union with coverage rights in retail, including shops, fast food, 
warehousing and distribution, petrol stations and pharmacies. Its membership exceeds 230,000 
(SDA 2011), primarily in sales, clerical and distribution occupations, making it the largest union 
in Australia. The SDA has amongst the highest levels of union density in the private sector. 
Union density in supermarkets is 28 per cent, whereas Australia’s overall private sector density 
is 13 per cent (ABS 2011). Retail density is however variable, averaging 16 per cent, yet only 4 
per cent in motor vehicle retailing (ABS 2011). Consistent with the characteristics of the retail 
labour force, the SDA’s membership is highly feminised, youthful, often part-time and in various 
forms of contingent employment. High staff turnover in the industry is reflected in high member 
turnover in the SDA, so continuous recruitment is critical and is a key challenge for the SDA. 
The industrial relations legislative context in which the SDA operates shapes relations with 
employers. In Australia, employment legislation provides a more comprehensive safety net of 
wages and working conditions for employees, through Awards and minimum standards, than in 
many other countries. Additionally, the objective of the Fair Work Act is to ‘provide a balanced 
framework for cooperative and productive workplace relations’ (FWA s.3), by privileging 
collective bargaining as a means of achieving business productivity and flexibility outside the 
award system.  Further, and in contrast to the UK and US, Australian unions do not need to 
campaign for recognition and, particularly since the advent of the new Fair Work Act 2009, 
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support for collective bargaining, underpinned by Awards, is reasonably strong. One aspect of 
the Australian legislation which has provided challenges for unions, however, is that the union 
security (‘closed shop’) arrangements that the SDA had relied on since the 1970s (Mortimer 
2001a) were abolished in 1996 (Peetz 1998), requiring the SDA to develop a range of 
recruitment strategies.   
Methodology  
We argue that the SDA provides a ‘theoretically useful case’ with the potential to extend existing 
theory (Eisenhardt 2002). A case study of the union was therefore considered the most 
appropriate form of analysis to explore its strategies vis-à-vis employers, and its experiences of 
collaboration. Since our research questions relate to how and why, following Yin (2009) a case 
study allows for detailed insights into the logic (intent), processes and outcomes of collaboration 
from the perspective of union officials and organisers.  
Interviews and focus groups with 12 SDA officials and 19 SDA organisers in both the national 
office and across five states were undertaken in 2010 and 2011. Interviewees were as follows: 
• National: 2 officials (individual interviews); 
• Queensland: 1 official, 3 organisers (individual interviews); 
• South Australia: 2 officials, 3 organisers (individual interviews); 
• Tasmania: 1 official, 1 organiser (individual interviews); 
• Western Australia: 1 official; 1 organiser (interviews); 4 organisers (focus group) 
• New South Wales: 1 official (individual interviews); 1 official, 3 organisers (focus 
group); and 
• Victoria: 2 officials (individual interviews): 1 official and 4 organisers (focus group). 
 
All interviews and focus groups were digitally recorded and transcribed. The data were coded 
using NVivo, on the basis of the extant issues identified in the collaboration literature.  
Research Findings  
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Preconditions for collaboration and intent of union  
In an environment where the SDA needs to protect members’ conditions to maintain legitimacy 
and yet struggles to maintain membership because of high industry turnover, the rationale for 
collaboration is: ‘if you can’t get your foot in the door, it is very difficult to improve terms and 
conditions for members’ (Official 5).  As already noted, the SDA’s membership is dominated by 
contingent workers, who, by virtue of their legal employment status, are overwhelmingly passive 
in their approach to unionism (Lynch et al. 2011), reducing the strategic potential of an 
organising approach. The SDA has a conscious strategy to find the balance between conflict and 
cooperation and to ‘try and find a middle position somewhere’ (Organiser 1). The SDA’s 
strategic approach is to deliver:  
constructive engagement with the employer. We don’t [resile] from the fact that our job 
is to get the best possible wages and conditions, best job security which we can for our 
members, but at the same time our message to employers is that we want to see a healthy 
and profitable business, because it is only a healthy and profitable business that can 
provide decent wages, … so to that extent their interest and the companies’ interests are 
in common (Official 4).  
The intent of the union derives from its political and ideological complexion, which has been 
shaped by its history. The SDA’s national leadership has remained the same for 34 years, and 
every state secretary except one has more than 24 years’ tenure. Arguably then, leadership 
continuity has stabilised the union’s approach. The ideological and political dimensions of the 
SDA’s power are impossible to ignore. The union has its origins in Australia’s strong, Irish, 
working-class Catholic heritage; an influence that is still felt today. By sheer weight of 
membership numbers, the SDA is the main union in a bloc of unions on the powerful right wing 
of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) (Warhurst 2008). This power has assisted the SDA to lobby 
for favourable legislative change, such as compulsory unionism in the 1950s (Balnave and 
Mortimer 2005) and a strong award system, and to resist, for many years, the deregulation of 
trading hours (Official 4). The SDA is a strong factional player in national and state Labor 
politics and in union politics: at least six former SDA officials are current federal 
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parliamentarians. This strength is a key element of the union’s power, particularly when the ALP 
is in government. Underpinned by conservative social policies and a moderate approach to 
industrial issues, the SDA focuses on maintaining collaborative and consultative relationships 
with employers. The SDA has taken full advantage of legislative support for unionism and 
collective bargaining. The first agreement with a major retailer, in 1971, ‘ensure[d] industrial 
peace’, as employers did not believe that retail employees would elect a militant leadership 
(Mortimer 2001a: 86). These preconditions and this history shape the processes adopted by the 
SDA.   
Processes  
Consistent with the preconditions for collaboration and its own history, the SDA eschews 
adversarialist relations with employers. The SDA favours processes that deliver ‘constructive 
engagement’. The two major processes involved in the ‘collaboration’ between the SDA and 
some of the major retail employers are interpersonal connections between union officials and 
company managers and orderly collective bargaining.  
Interpersonal relationships are multi-level: that is, at national, state, and retail store level. These 
relationships are characterised by stability on the SDA’s side, underpinned by officials’ long 
incumbency. In many cases, managers have also come from the shop-floor and thus have been 
members or delegates in the past, thus influencing their relationship with the SDA. Relationships 
underpin daily communication between the union and large employers regarding business and 
industrial issues. For example, the two largest grocery retailers regularly provide information to, 
and consult with, SDA officials: in one case every six weeks and, in another, almost daily. This 
information sharing ‘about how [they] are going as a company, their sales, profitability and so on 
… is part of [their] relationship with the union’ (Official 4). This relationship and the associated 
and on-going collaboration and information exchange enables issues to be dealt with as and 
when they arise for both parties. The same applies at state and organiser level. As one official 
explained:  
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I will try and develop a relationship with the state manager.  The organisers need to 
develop a relationship with the area manager. This is very important for problem solving. 
If the organiser can go to the area manager and say ‘Look you know me. We’ve been 
working closely together now for the last three years. I don’t manufacture problems. You 
know that, but this fella [supervisor]....he’s a real problem so let’s go in and sort it out.’ 
(Official 7). 
Every official and organiser interviewed stressed the critical importance of these interpersonal 
relationships for collaboration and successful and orderly collective bargaining. Relationships 
and collective bargaining appeared to be mutually constitutive: one long serving official argued 
that collective bargaining ‘created a strengthening of relationships and….really opened or 
educated a lot of companies that they need to be involved’ (Official 10). At the same time, the 
SDA’s privileging of collaborative relationships over adversarialism shapes its approach to 
bargaining. In short, the union never takes an aggressive ‘organising approach’ to bargaining for, 
as noted above it does not need to campaign for representation or recognition rights, as such 
rights are enshrined in the Fair Work Act 2009 (and were enshrined in previous legislation, even 
under conservative governments).  
According to the SDA, its relationships with major retail employers have ensured the 
maintenance of particular award and agreement conditions under changing legislation, allowing 
the union to circumvent some of the negative effects of the changing regulatory framework since 
1996 and particularly since 2005. For example, when certain clauses in awards and agreements 
became unenforceable in 2005 under the Work Choices legislation, SDA officials were able to 
use their established, collaborative relationships to persuade employers to sign memoranda of 
understanding, or common law agreements, to retain matters that were otherwise prohibited as 
‘an appendix to an agreement’ (Official 10). This mutuality is reflected in the fact that employers 
‘honoured memorandums of understanding’ (Official 2). Whereas many other unions were 
forced to fight for their members’ rights (Muir 2008), the SDA was able to maintain members’ 
conditions.  
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Some strategies are necessarily adversarial; the SDA, like other unions, played a major advocacy 
role in 2009 when the General Retail Award was being created (Official 4). Servicing the 
members relies on relationships with management.  The most common member grievance is 
about roster changes but, according to officials, interpersonal relationships allow the union to 
service its members quickly and resolve these grievances (Official 7, 10; Organiser 1, 5, 6). 
These relationships deliver results for the union and its members on an informal level initially, 
but more often than not via formal agreements. One challenge, however, to the sustainability of 
interpersonal union-management relationships is high turnover of human resource staff and 
managers within retail firms. This turnover, alongside the centralisation of human resources in 
most major retailers (Price 2004; Lynch et al. 2011), results in union officials and organisers 
periodically starting from a blank slate to establish relationships, necessitating a significant re-
investment of time and resources.  
The SDA’s strategy vis-à-vis employers has implications for organising. Encouraging employee 
voice via consultative committees and the like rarely occurs. An extensive delegate network does 
exist in all the larger retailers; delegates are active in communicating members’ views, and speak 
to new employees at store inductions. The union holds regular delegates’ meetings but 
attendance is low, ‘because they have every opportunity to contact the union through their 
organisers’ (Official 10), thereby indicating that a two-way flow of information between 
organiser and delegate is the norm, rather than delegate-to-delegate contact., The majority of 
members are passive recipients of union services (Lynch et al. 2011), consistent with the 
transient nature of retail employment (Ikeler 2011; Tilly and Carré 2011). Some member 
engagement occurs in the lead up to bargaining when member surveys are conducted (Official 
2), and when the union decides to campaign on an issue. Campaigning is however selective and 
primarily on issues such as public holiday trading, in line with a membership that is described as 
‘fairly passive’ (Organiser 1) and ‘not the most militant’ (Official 2). In Wood and Gray’s (1991: 
154) terms, this limits the member stakeholders’ involvement in collaboration; however, they 
note that ‘it does not appear that all stakeholders must participate’ [emphasis in original]. In the 
case of unions of course, lower participation reduces union democracy. However, this does not 
mean that the SDA necessarily achieves poor outcomes. 
12 
 
Outcomes  
Any union’s achievements are multifarious. They include outcomes with respect to wages and 
conditions, job security, density and aggregate numbers that proxy union strength, and more 
intangible factors such as control over working time allocation. The SDA has achieved 
significant gains for its members. Firstly, given that the union’s density is only 16 per cent, 
collective agreement coverage is high at 37 per cent of retail employees (Peetz and Price 2007), 
which is not much less than the average across the workforce (43 per cent) (ABS 2011). 
Secondly, wages are relatively high. The base rate in the General Retail Modern Award, which 
applies to small to medium enterprises, and to larger employers unwilling to bargain, is $647 or 
10 per cent above the statutory minimum wage, which currently sits at $589.  Collective 
agreements of course deliver more than this. Moreover, contrary to the situation in the UK where 
a figure just above the minimum wage prevails in retail collective agreements and do not feature 
in partnership agreements (Brown & Oxenbridge 2004; O’Brien-Smith & Rigby 2010), wage 
outcomes in SDA collective agreements are relatively high. The SDA has a total of 48 major 
collective agreements with large multiples, and has achieved around $725 a week in both 
Woolworths and Coles supermarkets (the two largest Australian supermarket chains); this 
amounts to a premium of 12 per cent on the Award and 23 per cent on the minimum wage. While 
wages are above the award, well above the statutory minimum and high by international 
standards (OECD 2010), SDA officials are aware that these results flow from the institutional 
context:  
I’m not singing from the rooftops that retail workers are earning a brilliant wage. I’d like 
to see them get paid a lot more but, in a worldwide context, they are doing quite well and 
a lot of that is because of the award system which underpins bargaining (Official 6). 
Collective agreements are extensive in scope, more so than elsewhere (Brown & Oxenbridge 
2004; Ikeler 2011; O’Brien-Smith & Rigby 2010), and provide for better working arrangements 
than the Award in key areas, including rostering and leave arrangements which, according to 
organisers are two of the biggest daily operational issues for members.  According to one 
organiser, store managers will say: ‘We are quiet now and need to change your roster; we are 
13 
 
busy now and need to change your roster’ (Organiser 5). However, agreements contain elaborate 
provisions that prescribe ‘specific rostering rights, [indicating] the things that companies can and 
can’t do’ (Official 4). For example, rostering rights provide for work over no more than five 
days, no more than one long day shift per week and no more than eight hours on a cash register 
(Woolworths National Agreement 2010), and are more restrictive for employers than 
corresponding arrangements in the UK (O’Brien-Smith & Rigby 2010). The result is employee 
protection against unrestrained managerial prerogative, although ‘companies complain it makes 
it far too rigid for them’ (Official 4). This is one example of where the broad domain of 
collaboration via collective bargaining leads to conflict, discussion, and eventually, what Wood 
and Gray (1991) term, ‘negotiated interorganizational order’.  
The SDA sometimes bargains using ‘grandparent clauses’, which retain conditions for existing 
employees but reduce them for new employees.  Penalty rates for some unsociable hours may be 
traded off for higher wage rates, but existing employees are covered by ‘saved rates’ clauses to 
maintain wages and conditions. Work on Sundays, for instance, is voluntary for those employed 
before the introduction of Sunday trading. It is the new recruits who are potentially worse off. 
Thus, the agreements provide for ‘mutual gains’: employers achieve greater flexibility in 
rostering and reduce the cost of penalty rates for Sunday trading for new employees, while all 
employees receive a higher base rate. Given the high staff turnover levels in retail (Ikeler 2011; 
Price 2004), large retailers have achieved significant savings by doing this (Mortimer 2001b). In 
addition, the SDA has traded off conditions for higher wages. For example, the ‘good’ 
agreements, like Coles’ and Woolworths’, extend the number of ‘ordinary’ hours when 
employees can be rostered to work and reduce Sunday wage loadings from 100 per cent in the 
award to 50 per cent in agreements, in exchange for the higher hourly rate.  
A major outcome of the SDA’s relationships with retailers, from the union’s perspective, is a 
range of union security provisions (Balnave and Mortimer 2005). One important example is the 
inclusion in agreements of a ‘recognition of rights’ clause which means the employer promotes 
union membership – or at least does not explicitly oppose it – which results in tacit agreement 
for payroll deduction of union dues. Another is union access to employers’ induction sessions for 
new employees. In such sessions, the membership take up rate is between 60 and 90 per cent 
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depending on the organiser or delegate involved (Organisers 1, 5, 9). In a context where the 
union needs to recruit around a third of its membership per year just to ‘stand still’ in aggregate 
numbers (Lynch et al. 2011), these arrangements contribute to its institutional security. 
Analysis 
The SDA’s relationship with retail employers in the ‘problem domain’ of employees’ wages and 
conditions – a key aspect of what unions deliver for members – exhibits the features found in 
collaborative arrangements. These features include: commitment to building trusting 
relationships based, in part, on interpersonal networks; information sharing and consultation, 
albeit limited, with members; and mutual recognition of the interdependent interests of 
employers, management and the union (TUC, 2001). The following sections analyse the 
preconditions, processes and outcomes of the SDA’s collaborations in the light of Gray and 
Wood’s (1991) framework.  
In relation to the preconditions for the SDA’s relationships with retailer employers, while they 
are not formalised by joint declarations, nor underpinned by any form of social partnership, ‘soft’ 
or ‘hard’, they are influenced by the fact that Australian IR legislation privileges and supports 
union recognition and collective bargaining to a greater extent than most (non-European) 
countries. Australian unions do not need to win a recognition battle, which is particularly 
significant for unions representing the low paid, many of whom are in contingent jobs and are 
unlikely to join unions (Lucas 2009), as demonstrated by almost uniformly low union density 
throughout the Western world in the industry (Dølvik and Waddington 2004). Further, the floor 
provided by Modern Awards in Australia for the low paid (Bailey, Macdonald and Whitehouse 
2011), and the relatively strong legislative underpinning for due process and ‘good faith’ in 
collective bargaining, shapes the ‘shared rules, norms and structures’ (Wood and Gray 1991: 
148), within which the SDA and retail employers collaborate. It is these legislative requirements 
that give the SDA the power to progress the needs of their members. Collective national 
institutions therefore still make a significant difference to the low-paid, including retail workers 
in Australia.  
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Key processes are collective bargaining and mutual interpersonal relationships between union 
and company officials that lubricate both collective bargaining and servicing: the latter primarily 
revolving around the negotiation of individual grievances. With respect to voice, the SDA is 
adopting strategies that de-emphasise equity and voice and instead privilege efficiency, similar to 
the UK retail partnerships (Byford 2009; O’Brien-Smith & Rigby 2010). In this process, union 
members are ‘distant’ rather than ‘near’ stakeholders; a strategy with implications for union 
democracy. With respect to employee voice, a number of officials rationalised that consulting 
members was difficult (Official 1, 3, 4 8), and therefore this was not an issue on their radar. As 
Wood and Gray (1991: 148) note, stakeholders ‘may relinquish some autonomy to the 
collaborative alliance’. In this instance, a largely contingent retail workforce that is not the 
subject of any mobilisation strategies means that the union leadership focuses on organising the 
employer rather than organising the membership. The trust developed over time between the 
SDA and retail employers has allowed the union to put issues on the bargaining table and 
subsequently include relevant clauses in agreements, and to maintain legislatively prohibited 
conditions in memoranda of understanding.  
Outcomes of collaboration between the SDA and retail employers are mixed. The SDA’s 
members – and non-members – have gained higher rates of pay. In the major Australian retailers 
where collective bargaining has been in place for well over a decade, wages are even higher – 
especially within an international context (O’Brien-Smith & Rigby 2010) – and there are 
significantly more constraints on managerial prerogative regarding rostering and workloads. It is 
also of note that terms in collective agreements can be enforced in Australia with relative ease by 
a trade union; in contrast to the UK where employer breaches are common and difficult to 
enforce (O’Brien-Smith & Rigby 2010). However, these gains by the SDA have been offset by a 
reduction in weekend penalty rates designed to allow employers to respond to changing patterns 
of retail demand. The SDA also gains institutional security from arrangements with employers 
regarding recruitment. Gains are therefore mutual. In Hyman’s (2005) terms, the SDA’s 
processes are oriented to ‘market’, less so to ‘society’, and not towards ‘class’. In sum, the 
SDA’s collaboration strategy has delivered institutional security, hourly wage outcomes, and 
collective bargaining coverage which, when measured against international standards, are indeed 
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very good. These outcomes however emphasise efficiency over equity and voice, and have 
limited the mobilisational capacity of the union.   
As argued earlier, collaboration comes in different varieties. Wood and Gray (1991: 149) assert 
that ‘defining a phenomenon gives us guidelines for recognizing the phenomenon when it occurs 
and for distinguishing it from other observable phenomenon’. We argue that the SDA’s 
relationships with employers are a ‘collaborative’ phenomenon. The active stakeholders in the 
collaboration are predominantly union officials and the HR managers of the major retailers. The 
problem domain includes wages and conditions, thus being broader in scope than many 
collaborative arrangements elsewhere (O’Brien-Smith & Rigby 2010; Roche 2009), and the 
interactive process is framed by legislation that privileges collective bargaining and provides the 
rules and structures for the process. In a context where collaboration is often fluid, evolving and 
fragile (Wood and Gray 1991), the SDA’s collaborations have been surprisingly enduring. For 
collaboration to succeed, it is necessary to establish a trusting, respectful relationship (Roche 
2009). This is inherent in the SDA’s relationships with many retail employers – at least from the 
SDA’s perspective. As one British organiser (immigrant) noted: ‘I think the biggest difference…. 
[is]….the union here [in Australia] is much more involved in companies’ (Organiser 5). Finally, 
a key feature of the SDA’s strategy is its longevity; it has adapted to changing industry 
ownership and changes to the institutional environment over more than four decades, in the 
pursuit of broader collaborative strategies.  This is notable as achieving co-operation is often 
fragile and uncertain (Bélanger and Edwards 2007; Brown and Oxenbridge 2004; Wood and 
Gray 1991), and can be highly ‘perishable’ in a dynamic environment (Thompson 2003; Jenkins 
2008). 
Efficiency, not only with respect to bargaining, but also in relation to union security, is key for 
the SDA. Maintaining membership is central to the union’s survival. Hence, recruitment is the 
SDA’s key strategy, and this in turn depends on establishing legitimacy and credibility with 
employers (Lynch et al. 2011), via the relationships described at length by interviewees, and 
particularly through the vehicle of collective bargaining. Indeed, these are long-standing SDA 
strategies identified by Balnave and Mortimer (2005) in earlier periods. Bargaining for union 
security is vital for a union that has such a high annual membership turnover (Lynch et al. 2011). 
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A key part of the legitimacy strategy on the part of the SDA and major retail employers is around 
‘collaboration’ in agreement making, which delivers stability and, therefore, mutual gains. 
Contrary to Bacon and Blyton (2007), who found mutual gains resulted only where conflictual 
tactics were adopted, we identify mutual gains from collaborative tactics. To date, the SDA’s 
collaborative strategy has delivered institutional security, hourly wage gains for contingent as 
well as permanent full-time workers, and robust collective bargaining coverage. The SDA has 
taken a particular path in choosing ‘[its] identities, [its] goals and who [its] opponents and allies 
are’ (Ross and Martin 1999: 2 as cited in Hyman 2005: 255). The union has made trade-offs 
between the aim of ‘getting the best deal for their members under the circumstances’ – its 
preferred position – and gaining workers’ allegiances by being a ‘sword of justice’ (Flanders 
1970) and by representing a ‘moral economy’ (Flanders 1970; Thompson 1971 as cited in 
Hyman 2005: 262). 
The union is thus working within constraints, as perceived by its long-term officials, on its power 
and resources. The union has identified that its chief power lies in markets in that retail, as a 
service industry, is largely sheltered from international product market competition. While this 
power could diminish with the growth of online retailing, the effects of online retailing in the 
SDA stronghold of supermarkets are much less than in clothing and small consumer goods. The 
union does not view mobilisation of retail workers as an option, and leadership changes in the 
next few years are unlikely to alter this position. Its collective action frame relies on patient and 
persistent advances that draw on official and organiser agency, but little on member agency. The 
SDA derives its power from sheer aggregate numbers, which gives it considerable institutional 
security, and from the regulatory supports for collective bargaining and union recognition in 
Australia. This means that collaboration with employers, while problematic in a number of 
respects, delivers outcomes that are reasonably respectable especially given the precarious 
position of services unionism internationally (Kelly 2011). In the ‘negotiated order’ that has 
arisen within the IR domain in Australian retail, the regulatory framework therefore plays a key 
part; with the union deriving small-p ‘political’ power and resources from that framework 
without, it appears, impinging too strongly on retailers’ managerial prerogative. 
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The present study is confined to the views and experiences of union organisers and officials. 
Whilst the data are valuable in understanding the preconditions, intent, processes and outcomes 
of collaboration between the SDA with retail employers from the union’s perspective, there is a 
need to further examine the experiences and views of employers and employees/members. By 
examining the totality of the parties’ views, a more holistic picture of Australian employment 
relations in retail, and the meaning of collaboration for all actors, can be developed. 
Nevertheless, this study makes an important first step in contributing to the literature, both in 
respect of the ‘union experience’ of collaboration outside Europe, the UK and US, and to the 
literature on employment relations in retail. 
Conclusion 
This paper has investigated ‘varieties of collaboration’ by analysing the SDA’s approach to 
collaboration with retail employers. We have argued that the addition of the Australian case is an 
important contribution to the extant literature, given the contrast with collaborative approaches in 
other national contexts including Europe, the US and the UK. Aside from differences in national 
and institutional contexts, including legislative support, differences in intent, processes and 
outcomes lead to substantive variants of collaboration. In the case of the SDA, their ‘particular 
way of operating’ is built upon pre-defined goals (intent), their ideological and political power, 
and the power relations, interests and expectations of the parties to the employment relationship. 
In its attempt to achieve institutional legitimacy, the SDA has much in common with retail 
unions in the UK (O’Brien-Smith & Rigby 2010), although the negotiated order of the SDA has 
greater longevity. The SDA’s choices are heavily shaped by an industrial relations system that 
privileges collective bargaining and does not require unions to win recognition. Whilst the 
outcomes of collaboration for the SDA can be evaluated both positively and negatively, one of 
the major strategic drivers of the SDA’s approach to collaborative relationships with employers, 
which, is itself a by-product of the institutional environment, is its approach to collective 
bargaining. Consistent with a wider power force-field view, collective bargaining has an ongoing 
and widespread influence on the relationship between the SDA and major Australian retailer 
employers, reinforcing Commons’ (1909, cited in Kaufman 2003) notion that collective 
bargaining is not simply a means for splitting the pie, but a system of industrial governance 
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which sets the framework for workplace relationships more generally. This focuses the attention 
of the SDA on shared concerns in the problem domain that is, ‘power with’ retail employers 
around issues of mutual concern. Further research should explore the same issues from the 
perspective of employees and employers, in order to develop a more nuanced understanding of 
collaborative arrangements in Australian retail. 
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